Threats from the Global Commons: Problems of Jurisdiction and Enforcement by Kaye, Stuart
v 
Threats from the Global Commons: 
Problems of Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
Stuart Kaye* 
Introduction 
O ceanscover approximately 70 percent of the surface of the Earth. For inter-national lawyers, this has long been an area which lay beyond the control 
of States . Prior to the advent of jurisdiction based on the continental shelf and the 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), almost all of this area was beyond national juris-
diction. O nly a tiny belt of sea of usually 3 to 4 nautical miles was subject to the di-
rect control of a coastal State.] Even today under the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea {l982 LOS Convention),2 where coastal States 
can extend their jurisdiction to the seabed and waters around their li ttoral out to 
200 nautical m iles. and the seabed in limited circumstances to as much as 350 nau-
tical miles,3 two-thirds of the world's oceans are beyond any national jurisdiction . 
This article considers the challenges facing coastal States attempting to combat 
threats to their security that pass through this vast area of high seas, in areas where 
the coastal State has no jurisdiction . It will consider the nature of the threats posed 
in these areas, and what tools international law provides States in order to respond 
to these threats. It will conclude by positing areas where further development may 
assist in improving the coastal State's ability to react in a timely and effective fash-
ion to a threat in the global commons. However, before doing so, it is necessary to 
consider the limits of the global commons for the purposes of the paper. 
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The Global Commons 
There are a number of different definitions possible for the extent of the oceanic 
global commons. One would be to limit the commons to areas entirely beyond na-
tional jurisdiction and control. This would include the deep seabed, referred to in 
the 1982 LOS Convention as the Area, consisting of all of the seabed outside the 
continental shelf of any State, and the waters beyond the EEZ of any State.4 These 
are commons as jurisdiction is vested, in the case of the Area, in the International 
Seabed Authority as part of the common heritage of mankind,s and in the case of 
the high seas, jurisdiction by States is limited to vessels flying their flag, except in 
very specific and limited circumstances. 
Yet in a number of ways, restricting the global commons to these areas does not 
adequately indicate the freedom from State jurisdiction that is available even in 
the waters of the EEZ. The EEZ only gives a coastal State jurisdiction over eco-
nomic activity, marine scientific research and environmental matters.6lt does not 
give a coastal State jurisdiction to interfere with freedom of navigation, the laying 
of submarine cables or pipelines, or to stop and board vessels unless they infringe 
coastal State laws concerned with the EEZ.7 This means that even if a foreign vessel 
had individuals onboard who had committed serious crimes against the coastal 
State, it would not be open for the coastal State to apply its law to that vesseL In 
some respects then, the EEZ remains an area of commons, even though the coastal 
State may still be able to regulate economic activities such as fishing and seabed 
mining. A similar situation is reflected for aerial navigation, as the airspace over 
the EEZ and high seas is international airspace, where there is a right of freedom of 
aerial navigation.! 
In the context of this article, the global commons will be treated as areas where 
the activities of vessels not subject to effective flag-S tate control cannot, for the 
most part, be regulated. This will certainly include the high seas, but would also en-
compass the EEZ, where, although the coastal State would possess the right to pro-
tect economic activities, it would lack the jurisdiction to regulate most other actors 
and activities from whence a threat may come. 
Threats from the Global Commons 
There are two distinct types of threats that come from the high seas. The first en-
compasses threats against the ports and terri tory of a coastal State that originate 
from the sea. Such threats might be through the shipment of weapons of mass de-
struction (WMD) or related delivery systems to a port for use against a State or its 
allies, or the use of a vessel in a direct attack. In the latter case, this could be from a 
70 
Stuart Kaye 
naval vessel, or could be accomplished using a commercial vessel which has been 
chartered, commandeered or hijacked and which is destroyed in the port of a State 
to cause damage to facili ties or human life. 
The first type of attack has yet to occur in the West, although it has occurred in the 
Middle East against Western interests.9 Even so, threats from shipping have been the 
focus of a tremendous amount of planning and cooperative effort internationally. 
The Proliferation Security Initiative iO and the International Ship and Port Facility 
Security Code (ISPS Code) II at an international level, or the United States' Con-
tainer Security Initiativel2 internally, are excellent examples of responses to this di-
rect threat from the sea. States have moved cooperatively to put in place legal 
measures designed to protect shipping and maritime infrastructure from terrorist 
threats, and to better cooperate in sharing data and intelligence, I) Significant prog-
ress in these areas has been made in a relatively short space of time, especially con-
sidering the scale and reach of the measures within the ISPS Code and that they 
were adopted and functioning well within five years of the 9/11 attacks. 14 
The first type of threat in some ways is relatively easily dealt with from a legal 
point of view. Once a vessel enters the port of a State, unless it is sovereign immune, 
it becomes subject to the regulation of the port State, whose criminal laws can be 
applied to activities taking place onboard. ls An attempt to ship WMD into a port 
would attract the jurisdiction of the port State, and enforcement action against the 
ship could be taken inside the port by local authorities. Even if the offending vessel 
is sovereign immune, it can be asked to vacate the port and the terri torial waters of 
the port State, and must comply in an expeditious fashion. Additionally, the ac-
tions of the offending vessel may give rise to a valid claim for damages against the 
flag State for any breaches of the law of the port State committed by the vessel. 16 
Port States can also close the port to international traffic or refuse vessels entry 
for failure to comply with entry requirements. For example, the Australian Mari-
time Identification System requires vessels to provide data to Australian authori-
ties of the vessel's crew, cargo, route and previously visited ports. This data is 
sought when the vessel is within 1,000 nautical miles of the Australian continent. 
Although there is no territorial jurisdiction to enforce such a measure, it has been 
effective because failure to provide the data may result in the vessel being refused 
entry to the port and subsequent arrest if it enters the terri torial sea with an inten-
tion to proceed to its intended port. The right of entry becomes tied to additional 
conditions, which can be used to improve security and give operators a clearer pic-
ture of the maritime securi ty environment in adjacent waters. 17 
The second type of threat is one directed at activities in the global commons. Ac-
tivities in the commons include transportation, fishing, oil and gas exploitation, 
and communications via submarine cable. Each of these activities is vulnerable to 
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attack from ships and aircraft on a range oflevels, and it is appropriate to consider 
each in turn. 
Attacks on ships at sea have been a feature of maritime transportation since an-
cient times. The legal concept of piracy is of great antiquity, and the ability of States 
to deal with piratical acts against their shipping is quite extensive. IS The 1982 LOS 
Convention, codifying existing customary international law, provides for universal 
jurisdiction over vessels engaged in piracy, provided that enforcement action is un-
dertaken by marked government vessels in areas outside the territorial sea of third 
States. 19 This potentially gives great freedom of action to flag States to use their 
armed forces to protect their shipping from pirate activity. 
In practice, the availability of universal jurisdiction to deal with piracy has been 
limited by two key factors. First1y, universal jurisdiction over piracy is limited to in-
cidents taking place outside the territorial sea. The 1982 LOS Convention retains 
the paramountcy of the coastal State's sovereignty within the territorial sea, and 
consistent with the regime of innocent passage, non -coastal State vessels lack the 
power to effect an arrest of a pirate vessel in these waters. 
The second factor is of greater relevance to recent concerns over securi ty. The 
traditional definition of piracy is the attacking of a vessel in pursuit of personal 
profit.2(I This motivation for profit distinguishes piratical acts from activities with a 
purely political motivation. Since terrorists are generally not motivated in their at-
tacks by the possibility of personal profit, but rather the advancement of a political 
cause or the desire to frighten and disrupt lawful activities, it has been accepted that 
terrorist acts at sea do not fall under the umbrella of piracy. 
While attacks on shipping present a threat from the global commons, there are 
other and different threats posed to other activities taking place in the world's 
oceans. Oil and gas exploitation of offshore fields means that there are large and ex-
pensive facilities permanently moored in areas remote from coastal areas. These 
platforms, loading facilities and pipelines are extremely vulnerable to hostile action. 
They are exploiting and storing quantities of flammable gases or liquids, which 
could be set alight by terrorist action, or alternatively could be the source of signifi-
cant environmental harm. 
Terrorist attacks against oil and gas platforms have not taken place, although the 
occupation of Brent Spar by Greenpeace in 199521 demonstrated the relative ease 
with which terrorists could occupy an offshore platform and the difficulties inher-
ent in their removal. Attacks against oil and gas facilities have taken place in the 
context of armed conflicts, and the facili ties are particularly vulnerable. The lack of 
a terrorist attack has not prevented international concern over the potential threat, 
and has led to international law providing coastal States and others greater powers 
to protect such facilities. 
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Submarine cables and pipelines are also an example of vulnerable assets in the 
global commons. All States have the right to lay cables and pipelines along the sea 
floor outside the territorial sea. These cables and pipelines cannot be restricted by 
the coastal State, although there is a right for coastal States to be consulted with re-
spect to the route such cables or pipelines might take. As with oil and gas platforms, 
a concrete terrorist threat against these facilities has yet to occur, but the possibility 
of damage and disruption is not insignificant. Terrestrial attacks against pipelines 
in Iraq and Nigeria have caused rises, albeit temporary, in world oil prices.21 At-
tacks against submarine pipelines wouJd have the added difficulties of causing 
widespread environmental harm, possibly to the EEZ of another State, and be far 
more expensive and difficult to repair. Submarine cables, especially fiber optic ca-
bles, still carry the bulk of the world's telephonic and electronic data, and their dis-
ruption could harm world communication in some areas for an extended period. n 
In both cases, the risk of harm from attack is not insubstantial. The locations of 
pipelines and cables are marked on commercially available charts and the coordi-
nates of cables can be downloaded from the Internet without cost. This because 
both pipelines and submarine cables are vuJnerable to accidental damage by mari-
ners engaged in lawful activities. Notice of their location reduces the risk of harm. 
The practical upshot of this legitimate and sensible precaution is to make the tar-
geting of such facili ties m uch easier for those engaged in potential terrorist activi-
ties against them. 
Responses 
International law has for many years permitted ships and flag States to protect 
themselves from attack. The fact that piracy attracts universal jurisdiction in areas 
beyond the territorial sea emphasizes this fact. Any ship that is subjected to an at-
tack by pirates outside the territorial sea can receive assistance, and the pirates 
taken into custody by the warships of any State. 
In the context of responding to attacks on its nationals or ships flying its flag, a 
flag State has a right of self-defense and can take steps to protect individuals and 
ships. This would permit naval escort of ships by the flag State and a right to take 
action to protect those ships from attack. DifficuJties may arise where a State's 
nationals are onboard vessels that are flagged to another State. This makes efforts at 
protection problematic, and wouJd require the flag State to consent to warships of 
another State providing protection. However, the provision of protection to other 
flagged vessels is by no means impossible with such consent and there is ample pre-
cedent for it during times of armed conflict. 24 Such difficulties were avoided during 
the Iran-Iraq war when, after tankers entering the Persian Gulf had come under 
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fire from Iran, the United States Navy (and navies of other neutral nations) formed 
convoys of neutral-flag merchant vessels, or escorted or accompanied neutral-flag 
merchant vessels carrying cargoes to and from neutral States.25 
In the context of protecting shipping from terrorist attack, a separate instru-
ment was negotiated under the auspices of the International Maritime Organiza-
tion (IMO) to facilitate a response, The Convention for the Suppression of Unlaw-
ful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation26 (SUA Convention) was nego-
tiated as a direct result of the 1985 hijacking of the Italian liner Achille Lauro.27 The 
necessity for an international response was manifested in part because of differ-
ences within the international community as to whether the attack constituted pi-
racy. This was because of the requirement that piracy be for "private" ends, and the 
fact the group that attacked the vessel, the Palestinian Liberation Front, staged the 
attack for political purposes. Other States, including the United States, considered 
that the attack amounted to piracy, and were concerned that responses to an inci-
dent of this type might be undermined if it were not considered a piratical act.28 
Obviously, with this difference of view it was necessary to create an international 
instrument to clarify the response to what was still manifestly an illegal act. 
The response adopted was the 1988 SUA Convention. It dealt with certain acts 
against shipping, including seizing a ship, acts of violence against individuals on a 
ship, damage to a ship or its cargo so as to endanger its safe navigation, endanger-
ment of the safety of a ship by interfering with maritime navigational facilities or 
sending a false signal.29 The purpose motivating the acts is not relevant, and there-
fore there would be some overlap with piracy, although the scope of the SUA Con-
vention is necessarily much wider. The SUA Convention applies to ships that have 
journeyed outside the terri torial sea of a single State, or are scheduled to pass out-
side the territorial sea.:lO Parties to the SUA Convention have jurisdiction to deal 
with such offenses, based on the ship's presence in their territorial sea, possession 
of their flag or other means.3] However, the SUA Convention did not deal directly 
with the boarding of vessels where jurisdiction might be asserted by another State. 
The Preamble of the SUA Convention provides "matters not regulated by this 
Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general intema-
tional law," which would limit non-flag State intelVention to acts covered under 
Article 110 of the 1982 LOS Convention, in this context acts of piracy.32 There are 
also provisions to allow for either prosecution or extradition of individuals be-
lieved to have committed offenses.33 
In 2005 the SUA Convention was amended by a new protocol pertaining to 
maritime terrorism against shipping.34 The focus of the 2005 amendments is 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their non-proliferation.35 New offenses 
were created, including using a ship as a platform for terrorist activities,36 and the 
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transportation of a person who has committed offenses under the SUA Conven-
tion,37 or any of another nine listed anti-terrorism conventions.3a The 2005 
amendments also widen the scope for third party boarding of ships, although Ilag-
State authorization is still required for such a boarding.39 
States also were of the view that maritime terrorism need not be limited to ships, 
but could also be directed at offshore oil and gas installations. This led to the adop-
tion of a protocol to the SUA Convention (1988 Protocol)40 that dealt with similar 
acts committed against offshore petroleum installations at the same time as the 
SUA Convention.41 
The 1988 Protocol applies to "fixed platforms," which is liberally defined to in-
clude all petroleum producing structures.42 It also limits application to facilities on 
the continental shelf. This excludes the application of the protocol to installations 
in the territorial sea of a coastal State, in the ordinary course of events.43 The of-
fenses under the 1988 Protocol are analogous to those under the SUA Convention. 
These include seizing a platform by force, destruction or damage threatening the 
safety of a platform, the placing of a device designed to damage or destroy or en-
danger the safety of a platform, or threats, intimidation, or acts of violence against 
persons onboard a platform.44 
States under the 1988 Protocol have a similar jurisdictional envelope as under 
the SUA Convention. The 1982 LOS Convention makes it clear that States have ju-
risdiction over offenses taking place on fixed platforms on their continental shelf, 
and this is confirmed in the 1988 Protocol. 45 In addition, under the Protocol, States 
also have jurisdiction if either the offender or the victim is a national of the State, if 
the offender is stateless and a habitual resident of the State, or if the offense is in-
tended to coerce the State concerned.46 
The 1988 Protocol does not deal with the issue of boarding of fixed platforms, 
and as with the SUA Convention, the preamble reiterates "that matters not regu-
lated by this Protocol continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general 
international law," apparently limiting direct unilateral intervention against acts 
against platforms to the coastal State. This was to ensure that a coastal State would 
retain sole jurisdiction over activities on its platforms, and another State could not 
assert it had a right to board a platform, based on having jurisdiction over an of-
fense. The absence of a boarding provision would not prevent a coastal State from 
giving a third State an ad hoc authorization to board its installation. 
The 1988 Protocol was also amended by protocol in 2005,47 with amendments 
similar in nature to the 2005 SUA Convention amendments. New offenses, includ-
ing using explosives or radioactive material or a biological, chemical, nuclear 
(BCN) weapon to cause death, serious injury or damage to an installation;48 releas-
ing oil or gas from an installation in a manner calculated to cause death, serious 
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injury ordamage;49 or the threat to commit such offenses,so were created.51 A State 
party must take the measures necessary to apply its jurisdiction to its nationals and 
fixed platforms on its continental shelf in respect to these offenses.52 Much of the 
rest of the SUA Convention and the 2005 amendments, in relation to extradition, 
cooperation concerning data and evidence, and domestic implementation. are ap-
plied by the 2005 Protocol mutatis mutandis.53 
The 2005 SUA Convention amendments and 1988 Protocol amendments will 
enter into force after the twelfth ratification without reselVation$-l for the SUA 
Convention amendments55 and ninety days after the third ratification without 
reservation56 for the Protocol amendments.57 Given the current wide participation 
in the SUA Convention and 1988 Protocol, both the Convention amendments and 
Protocol amendments are likely to enter into force relatively quickly. 
Responses in relation to the protection of submarine cables and pipelines have 
been less forthcoming. The 1982 LOS Convention does provide that a coastal State 
must be consulted over the route a cable or pipeline on its continental shelf may take, 
but not that the coastal State has jurisdiction over the cable or pipeline. S8 If a cable or 
pipeline owned by a coastal State or its nationals were damaged, the LOS Convention 
provides that the flag State of the vessel, or of the nationality of the offender responsi-
ble, has jurisdiction to deal with the harm caused.59 A coastal State could only assert 
jurisdiction in the event the damage to the cable or pipeline also caused harm to the 
environment, on the basis of the coastal State's EEZ jurisdiction/,o 
A coastal State asserting jurisdiction over an attack on a pipeline presents more 
options than the situation for submarine cables. An attack on an oil pipeline would 
probably cause environmental damage. and therefore provide a basis for a coastal 
State to assert its jurisdiction.61 Article 79(4) of the 1982 LOS Convention creates 
an implication that a coastal State can make laws dealing with leaks from pipelines. 
A coastal State might also respond to an attack on a cable or pipeline on the basis of 
self-defense. To do so it would need to demonstrate the importance of the threat-
ened infrastructure to itself, and that a use of force is proportionate in the circum-
stances. This will always be a question of fact, and would be dependent upon the 
cable being vital telecommunications infrastructure. or a pipeline carrying essen-
tial o il or gas for the national econom y.62 Even in those circumstances, an isolated 
attack, not immediately detected by the coastal State, or indeed other States using 
the cable or pipeline, might make it difficult to justify a response involving the use 
of force. 
One way to increase the ability of States to respond to attacks on pipelines and 
submarine cables might be to base an argument upon Article 3bis( l )(a)(iii) of the 
2005 SUA Convention amendments. This provision creates an offense where an 
individual "uses a ship" to cause damage. 63 If the employment of a ship to aid 
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terrorists in attacking a cable or a pipeline could be described as a "use" of a ship 
in the context of Article 3bis, then there could be jurisdiction. It is submitted that 
such a wide definition is almost certainly beyond the anticipated scope of the of-
fense. If the definition could sustain such stretching, the consent of the flag State 
would still be required to effect a boarding,6oI and the flag State be a party to the 
2005 Protocol amending the SUA Convention. 
Placing jurisdiction over pipelines and submarine cables outside the territorial 
sea in the control of the flag State of the offending vessel is, under the 1982 LOS 
Convention, problematic. If terrorists attacked a pipeline or cable with a chartered 
vessel, perhaps a fishing trawler, the vessel may well be flagged in a State with an 
open registry. This would substantially undennine the prospects of enforcement 
action, as it is dear that a number of States with open registries that have attracted 
fishing vessels, such as Georgia, Togo or Equatorial Guinea,6s have no capacity to 
deal with attacks even dose to their coasts. 
Reliance on flag-State jurisdiction in the co ntext of cables and pipelines 
serves to highlight a broader problem, that is, the limitations of flag-State juris-
diction over vessels. While the jurisdiction of a flag State remains the para-
mount mechanism to determine the applicable law aboard a vessel, in the case of 
States with open registries the connection to flag States can be so diffuse as to be 
meaningless. In that circumstance, it is difficult to conceive that effective enforce-
ment at sea can take place. Flag-of-convenience States have no capacity to enforce 
their laws on ships flying their flag around the world, and may have little incentive 
to cooperate with other States to remedy the deficiency. The United States has 
sought to tackle the problem in the context of the Proliferation Security Initiative 
with boarding agreements with a number of States with open registries, including 
Liberia and Panama;66 they fall short of permitting boarding in a wider range of 
circumstances. 
Conclusion 
The international community has shown great energy in tackling threats in the 
global commons. The SUA Convention and Protocol in their 2005 iterations rep-
resent a substantial and positive step fOlWard in the legal protection of ships and 
platforms in the global commons beyond the territorial sea. However, it is appar-
ent that States have yet to create protection fo r the totality of activities that take 
place beyond the territorial sea. Adequate jurisdictional mechanisms to ensure an 
effective response to attacks on submarine cables and undersea pipelines do not ex-
ist, nor does it appear there are international efforts in progress to remedy the 
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situation. It can only be hoped that it is not the reality of an attack that acts as the 
catalyst to produce positive change in these areas. 
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